On the ground of Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism’s similar endorsement of both Representationalism and Non-Cognitivism (see Blackburn, 1984, p. 216 and Rosen, 2005, p. 14), since Blackburn (1984)’s inception of Quasi-Realism, there has been debates revolving around the classification of his theory, namely, whether Quasi-Realism is a theory of Expressivism or Fictionalism.
Lewis (2005, pp. 314-321) commenced the argument: “Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism”, from firstly (even though this is, literally, not the first part of his article, but logically it is) drawing on Quasi-Realism, Fictionalism and Projectivism’s similar motivation of solving a salient problem with Moral Realism. Lewis contended that, if we endorse Moral Realism, then we are inexorably making the following commitment (pp. 315-316):
- There are distinct moral properties that exist independently of our attitudes.
- We have the capacity to detect these moral properties.
- Upon detecting these properties, there is an inevitable evocation of moral attitudes.
This commitment to the ontological being of objective moral properties come with obvious problems. For example, from Relativism, in a world with miscellaneous moral standards, how is it possible for us to justify all those prevailing moral disagreement while upholding the objectivity of moral properties? And from Motivational Internalism, how do these objective moral facts motivate us? Having made the preceding problem clear, Lewis goes on to explicate on how Fictionalism and Quasi-Realism delt with the problem, respectively.
For Fictionalists, they simply acknowledge that while they engage in moral discourse as if Moral Realism were true without belief in the underlying reality. They maintain that doing so can be practical, despite being premised on fictions. In essence, Lewis avowed that the Fictionalists cancel the assertoric force of their moral propositions by using a “disowning preface” that precedes all their moral locutions, namely, “Let’s make-believe that moral realism is true, though it isn’t. + (subsequent moral propositions)” (pp. 315, 319)
And for Quasi-Realists, since Blackburn (1984) himself devised his theory largely under the impact of Hume’s Projectivism (p. 145), Quasi-Realism inevitably alludes to explications from Projectivism, namely, our “evaluative properties are projections of our own sentiments” (Blackburn, p. 180). Quasi-Realism thereby allows us to form moral propositions without metaphysical commitments by using a special semantics to reinterpret our moral propositions (as moral sensibilities) rather than assertions of facts.
The critical objection that Lewis has made comes in here. He contended that the ways the Fictionalists and Quasi-Realists tackled the metaphysical problem (as elaborated in the previous two paragraphs) are de facto the same. Drawing on the aforementioned Quasi-Realism’s propinquity with Projectivism, Lewis (2005) claimed that “One of Blackburn’s avowed aims is to earn the right to say what the ‘moral realist’ does (which is what Projectivism purports to do): that means either being or make-believedly being a realist.” (p. 319) I.e., according to Lewis, since they both reject Moral Realism; Quasi-Realists, just like Fictionalists, are inevitably (as dichotomised by him) using the same “disowning preface” to cancel the assertoric force of whatever follows, so as to “make-believe” (i.e., The Quasi-Realist semantics is also a fiction). It is just that (some) Fictionalism has made this preface overt, while Quasi-Realism kept it covert.
The essential argument that I shall make here lies in understanding that Quasi-Realism’s special semantics of interpreting our moral propositions does not make Quasi-Realism a theory that engages in pretences of moral facts. Rather, it still retains the core property of Expressivism, which is to reinterpret our moral propositions as primarily vehicles for expressing attitudes.
Lewis’s dichotomy of what Quasi-Realism may fall to can be described as follows:
P1: Projectivism aims to earn the right to do what Moral Realists’ moral assertions do. (without any metaphysical commitments)
P2: Quasi-Realism is motivated by the same reason as Projectivism.
C1 and subsequently P3: Quasi-Realism aims to earn the right to do what Moral Realists’ assertions do.
C2: [Quasi-Realism being Moral Realism] or [it make-believedly being Moral Realism]
The problem comes with P2, although Blackburn (1984) was influenced by Projectivism in devising Quasi-Realism, it does not follow that Quasi-Realism entails Projectivism. (p. 180) Hence, it cannot be arbitrarily said that Quasi-Realism and Projectivism share the same motivation simply due to their propinquity. Arguably, the Quasi-Realists are not even trying to do anything that Realist moral assertions would do. They are merely proposing a theory of semantics that could help us to reinterpret moral propositions into expressions of attitudes while eschewing the Frege-Geach Problem, earning us the right to sensibly express attitudes. To put this difference into perspective, I shall present a comparison, differentiating the “prefaces” of the two theories:
Fictionalism:
“Let’s make believe that moral realism is true, though it isn’t. + (subsequent content)” (Lewis, p. 319)
Quasi-Realism:
“From now on let’s adopt a new framework of semantics, where: e.g.,
{P1: Torture is wrong.
P2: If torture is wrong, then torturing cats is wrong.
C: Torturing cats is wrong.}
Just means:
{P1’: Boo! Torture.
P2’: Hooray! [Boo! (Torture) & Boo! (Torturing cats)], or, Boo! [Boo! (Torture) & not-Boo! (Torturing cats)]
C’: Boo! (Torturing cats).}
+ (subsequent content)”
While using the Fictionalists’ preface would transform our subsequent locutions into pretences, adopting a Quasi-Realist one would not. A set of semantics does not “disown” anything, it just manifests how we genuinely interpret words into meanings. In other words, the “preface” of Quasi-Realism is merely a consistent (and proper) scheme of how our attitudes should be interpreted, it has nothing to do with Realist moral assertions or pretence of Realist moral assertions. Lewis has falsely attributed the Fictionalist preface onto the Quasi-Realist discourse.
To clarify things even further, I shall list some comparable facets of the two theories.
| The Theory | Moral Propositions | Means of Interpretation | Subjective Agreement with What We Say? |
| Fictionalism | Moral Realist Propositions (facts) | Moral Realist Semantics | Pretence of them being objectively true |
| Quasi-Realism | Expressivist Propositions (attitudes) | Quasi-Realist Semantics | Correspondent to how we genuinely feel (not belief) |
Hitherto, it is clear that Quasi-Realism, despite its endorsement of Representationalism (the semantic scheme being represented), still retains the core characteristic of Expressivism, namely, our moral propositions primarily express our evaluative attitudes. Therefore, Quasi-Realism is a theory of Expressivism, not Fictionalism.
Nevertheless, proponents of the Fictionalist interpretation of Quasi-Realism might still object that Quasi-Realism’s use of Realist language inevitably leads to a form of make-believe. They could argue that, regardless of the Expressivist core, the de facto outcome of Quasi-Realism aligns with that of Fictionalism, as both endorse the utility of moral language while eschewing belief in moral facts.
In response, such objections fall short by conflating outcome with the theories’ inceptive intentions. While both Fictionalism and Quasi-Realism engage with moral language, they do so with fundamentally different approaches. Quasi-Realism, through Expressivism, allows sincere engagements with moral language that reflect genuine evaluative stances, not disingenuous facades of belief. It is not the utility of moral language that Quasi-Realism seeks to preserve, but its capacity to articulate and communicate our moral sensibilities effectively. Thus, charges that allude to the similar practical outcome of Fictionalism and Quasi-Realism are confusing causes and effects, and therefore missing the point.
References:
Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the word: Groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (2005). Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism. In M. E. Kalderon (Ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics (pp. 314–321). essay, Oxford University Press.
Rosen, G. (2005). Problems in the History of Fictionalism. In M. E. Kalderon (Ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics (pp. 14–64). essay, Oxford University Press.
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